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ABSTRACT
In recent years, much has been made of the looming demographic crisis that is forming
in Japan. The declining birthrate and graying of the population has made many
government officials, sociologists, and scholars very anxious about what will happen
when a nation begins to shrink. These same officials and scholars are also looking for a
reason for the decline, and many have placed the blame on Japanese women without
examining the reasons these women have for having fewer children or forgoing
motherhood altogether. But Japan is not the only nation suffering from population
decline. Other smaller, industrialized nations also face the same challenge- some better
than others. This paper will examine the reproductive climates of Japan, Norway, and
Italy as a way to understand the social, economic, and practical reasons women in Japan
decline to have children, and to create a holistic, broad based policy aimed at making
the reproductive climate of a nation more appealing to women. By establishing the
paradigm of the reproductive climate, this paper hopes to move the discussion of
fertility from one that places the primary burden on women to one in which all facets of
society are considered when discussing the problem of declining world fertility.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Across the globe, fertility rates have been falling in both developed and developing
nations since the 1950’s.1 This is due to a variety of reasons, ranging from increased prosperity,
to increased access to birth control, to environmental concerns and the increased status of
women’s equality in both the developed and developing world. This trend is seen by many as a
net positive- especially in less developed nations where a lower birth rate often translates to
less resource demanded from the government. However, this trend can be particularly
dangerous for a subset of nations: smaller, industrialized nations with a largely homogenous
population and low immigration rates. These nations face the looming possibility of population
decline, and with that, the accompanying economic and social problems that come with it.
Without substantial effort to increase the fertility rates in these nations, there will be
substantial social and economic problems that could lead to both societal and economic issues
within just one or two generations.
The most important statistic in this scenario is the fertility rate, the definition of which
for the purposes of this thesis is “the number of children an average woman is likely to have
during her childbearing years, conventionally taken to be the ages 15-49.” .2 The fertility rate is
often used as a measure of the social and economic health of a nation. Too high of a number
shows unsustainable population growth, and is often quoted as indicative of a lesser developed
nation while a more developed nation typically has a smaller number of births per women.
“Go forth and multiply a lot less.” (2009, October 29). The Economist, Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/node/14743589=.
1
2

Ibid.
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However, there is heightening concern that a growing number of nations are getting too close
to, or even too far below, the magical number of 2.1 births per woman known as replacement
rate.3 This is not a hard and fast number, as, “child mortality is higher in poor countries, [so] the
replacement fertility rate is higher there, too. In rich countries, it is about 2.1. In poor ones it
can go over 3.0.”4 This number also accounts for the possible death of female children by
adding a fractional contingency to the birth rate.5 And, as fertility rates drop, many people,
from economists, to sociologist to politicians, have become concerned about the number of
nations who are now below replacement rate, citing the graying of society and the trouble that
young people will face as they have to support aging parents with fewer resources. 6 For
instance, in Singapore, “in 2011 seven working adults supported one retiree. By 2030, 2.3
working adults will have to support one retiree.” 7 Singapore, like many developed nations, has
a robust pension system administered by the government and supported by taxes on the wages
of younger and middle aged workers. The shrinking younger generation does not just impact
the government; as time goes on, fewer and fewer adult children will be available to care for
aging parents, and as the work force shrinks, the real possibility of shortages in nursing staff,
care homes for the elderly, and other paraprofessionals presents itself. And, like many other
3

“Go forth and multiply a lot less.” (2009, October 29). The Economist, Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/node/14743589=.
4

Ibid.

5

“Go forth and multiply a lot less.” (2009, October 29). The Economist, Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/node/14743589=.
6

“Lee, K. Y. (2012, October 16). Warning bell for developed countries: Declining birth rates.” Forbes, Retrieved
from http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2012/10/16/warning-bell-for-developed-countries-decliningbirth-rates.
7
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developed nations, like Japan and Italy, their fertility rate is falling. Asia, Europe, Australia, and
North America all face dwindling fertility rates, and all face the looming threat of social
insolvency and a failed social welfare system.
One nation in particular has become the subject of many papers and articles concerning
low fertility rates: Japan. At 1.39 births per woman, Japan has one of the lowest birth rates
among all nations, developed or otherwise.8 The declining birthrate and graying of the
population has made many government officials, sociologists, and scholars very anxious about
what will happen when the nation’s population begins to shrink. These same officials and
scholars are also looking for a reason for the decline, and many have placed the blame on
Japanese women without examining the reasons these women have for having fewer children
or forgoing motherhood altogether. Raising the fertility rate in Japan is of special significance in
terms of policy, as the fertility rate has been below rate of replacement for almost four decades,
and if the fertility rate does not increase soon, Japan will be serious danger on multiple fronts.
However, Japan is not the only nation facing low birthrates. Nations like, “Germany:
1.4…, Holland: 1.8 … [and] Italy: 1.4” 9 also have rates well below the replacement threshold.
These nations also have very homogenous populations, and thus cannot, and for cultural
reasons, do not want to, rely on recent immigrants for a boost to population and fertility rates.
Interestingly, there are some developed nations who are not struggling as badly with low
fertility rates. Nations such as Norway (1.95) and Sweden (1.9) have fertility rates that are
8

The World Fact Book, 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
9

Lee, K. Y. (2012, October 16). “Warning bell for developed countries: Declining birth rates.” Forbes, Retrieved
from http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2012/10/16/warning-bell-for-developed-countries-decliningbirth-rates/
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much closer to the 2.1 births per woman replacement level.10 These nations, equally
homogenous as Japan, have obviously been doing something different. We must examine what
differentiates nations like Norway, from nations like Italy and Japan which are two of the
nations with the lowest fertility rates in the world. By doing some, hopefully the characteristics
of a nation with a healthy fertility rate can be found, and thus, policy prescriptions created in
order to counter act low fertility crises worldwide.
This paper will compare and contrast the nations of Norway, Japan, and Italy as a
means of exploring what factors encourage women to have children. Japan’s sustained low
fertility rate and the vast numbers of articles, both scholarly and from the media, makes it an
ideal subject of study. This infamy has led to numerous articles, including one in which Japan
was also called the “Worst Country for Working Mothers” in 2013 by the British Broadcasting
Company(BBC). 11 This was due to a number of factors, including the massive gender gap in pay,
low numbers of working mothers, and expensive day care costs. Italy’s low fertility problem
may not be as famous, but that the rate has declined so low is of particular interest as Italy’s is
the host of Vatican City, the seat of the Catholic Church. The choice to examine Italy, rather
than Japan’s neighbor and cultural cousin South Korea with a fertility rate of 1.29 births per
woman was a conscious one.12 Choosing Italy as the comparison country is an effort to show
that low fertility is not just a problem that afflicts Asian nations, it is a global problem. The
The World Fact Book, 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
10

Wingfield-Hayes,R. (2013, March 21). “Japan: The worst developed country for working mothers?” BBC News.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21880124.
11

The World Fact Book, 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
12

5
contrast nation, Norway, was chosen because of its relatively high fertility rate, homogenous
population, and reputation for generous gender, family and social policies. Another factor in
the decision to choose Norway was its ratings in the Global Economic Forum Gender equality
index. Norway consistently rates within the top five, and in 2013 was ranked number three in
the world for gender equality, behind Iceland and Finland; Italy’s rank is 71, and Japan’s is 105.13
The drastic differences between the low fertility rate nations, Japan and Italy, and the high
fertility rate nation, Norway, will serve to make the differences between low fertility nations
and higher fertility nations clearer.
The metrics that will be examined will be maternal support structures, the economy,
and societal expectations of women and mothers. These factors make up the major variables in
a nation’s reproductive climate. The selection of these factors will be discussed further in
Chapter 2. The reproductive climate is a holistic, interdisciplinary view of the economic, social,
and governmental state of the nation, with a particular emphasis on the treatment of women
and mothers. This broad look at the issues that influence the decision to have children is
distinct from previous work on the subject, as previous scholarly works have tended to focus on
single issues that are thought to affect fertility rates. The reproductive climate analysis is akin
to the Global Economic Forum’s gender equality rating index, in that it examines multiple
factors to determine the suitability of a nation in which to raise a family. This reproductive
climate influences the decision to have a new child, or to start a family at all for women. To
determine what makes a poor reproductive climate, the nations of Italy and Japan will be

Global Economic Forum, (2013). The global gender gap report 2013. Retrieved from World Economic Forum
website: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf.
13
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compared in order to discover similarities in the metrics. Then, Italy and Japan will be
compared to Norway in order to discover what, if anything, Norway is doing differently. The
differentiation between poor fertility rate nations and the healthy fertility rate nation will allow
for the creation of reproductive profiles, and from that, a series of policy prescriptions.
To facilitate this discussion, this thesis will be structured as such. First, there will be a
review of the major theories of the metrics of a reproductive climate. Following that will be
case studies for Japan, Norway, and Italy. These case studies include basic demographic
information, followed by an examination of the three metrics of the study. The examination will
be followed by an evaluation of the reproductive climate of the nation as a whole. The next
chapter will be the overall analysis of the similarities and differences of the reproductive
climates of the three nations, and how the nations with lower birthrates can modify the
reproductive climate to make it a more welcoming place for women to start families. These
recommendations, and the study as a whole, will hopefully be used to shift the discussion of
low fertility from a series of single issue policies and platitudes, towards a holistic, broad based
initiative to make all aspects of society more welcoming to women and the children they bear.

7

Chapter 2 The Reproductive Climate and Theory Review
Previous research into the causes of low fertility rates in developed nations has tended
to focus on single issues that are considered contributing factors. Economists, sociologists,
feminists and political scientists have all studied this issue, and have all come to different
conclusions as to what is the cause of low fertility in a developed nation. These studies have
influenced the implementation of policies to encourage women to have more children, to
varying degrees of success. Japan, which has generous paid family leave, subsidized daycare
and a cash payment upon the birth of a child, however, still suffers from low fertility, with a
rate of only 1.4 births per woman.14
The government efforts to increase fertility focus solely on the care and expense of a
child. This narrow focus on a single issue ignores the reality that major decisions are not made
in consideration of a single issue. The factors that go into choosing to have a child range from
issues of economic stability to issues of equality, to the division of labor within the home. Due
to the variety and availability of birth control in the industrialized world, children are usually
planned for in good conditions, and avoided when conditions are poor. The reproductive
climate analysis considers many of the issues in examining and evaluating a nation’s fitness in
which to raise a family. By taking a broad, interdisciplinary view of a nation and the factors that,
contribute to low fertility rates, the characteristics of a nation with a healthy fertility rate can
be discovered, and more effective programs discovered and implemented in struggling nations.
The World Fact Book, 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
14

8
After a thorough review of previous literature on the subject, three major categories of
studies emerged. The three categories are: the economy, maternal support structures, and
social and family expectations. These three subsets are the metrics by which the reproductive
climate will be examined and graded, with the overall goal of determining what makes a good
reproductive climate and what makes a poor one. It must be noted that these metrics are not
isolated factors. One metric may highly influence another. For instance, there may be fewer
maternal support structures for women in a culture with the social expectation that women will
cease employment after the birth of a child, and thus women will be paid less over all as they
are seen as a poor investment by the company that hires them. This leads women to cease
family formation activity, as they desire to keep their jobs.

A. Economy
There are numerous studies on the impact of the economy on fertility rates. Some
studies have pin-pointed increased female participation in the work place as a reason for low
fertility rates. Many others have studied the impact of issues such as recession, youth
unemployment and unequal pay. These issues all play a factor in the economy of a nation, and
as a result, the choice of whether or not to have children.
There are numerous studies on the impact of female workforce participation on fertility rates
in the developed world. Previous research has indicated that higher female workforce
participation leads to lower fertility rates because of the increased opportunity costs of having
children, and the inability to care for children on the work site. According to research by
Namkee Ahn and Pedro Mira, “the correlation between TFR [Total Fertility Rate] and FPR

9
[Female Participation Rate] was negative and significant during the 1970's and up to the early
1980's.”15 Ahn and Mira later go on to state that since the mid 1980’s, female workforce
participation has become positively correlated with higher fertility rates.16 Other researchers
also concluded that increased workplace participation by women leads to increased fertility
rates industrialized nations.17 Thus, the employment of women is not an obstacle in raising
fertility rates: unemployment is. Women are now able to choose to have children when it is
most advantageous, as a result, “women would rather postpone childbearing until they
accumulate sufficient human capital.”18 This desire for a stable income and desire to work
means that high female workforce participation is a sign of a healthy reproductive climate.
High female unemployment, as well as underemployment, creates a poor reproductive climate
that forces women to wait until older ages to have children, limit the number they have, and to
sometimes forgo childbearing entirely.
Another issue that can affect fertility rates is pay. There are two conflicting theories on
the impact of pay on fertility rates. One theory, the substitution effect, is that high or equal pay
lowers fertility because of the opportunity costs of taking time to care for children.19 According
to Becker, women may forgo child care in order to pursue income producing activity.20 The
15

Ahn, N., & Mira, P. (2002). “A note on the changing relationship between fertility and female employment rates
in developed countries.” Journal of Population Economics, 15(4), 667-682.
16

Ibid.

17

Adsera, A. (2005). “Vanishing children: From high unemployment to low fertility in developed countries.”
American Economic Review, 189-193.
18
19

Ibid.

Becker, G. (1960). “An economic analysis of fertility.” In Demographic and Economic Change in Developed
Countries, pages 209–231. Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research.
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other is the income effect which theorizes that, “an increase in the female wages may increase
fertility.”21 The substitution effect was more of a factor in nations who were just starting to see
women enter the workforce, but as women have become more permanent in the workforce,
the income effect has largely supplanted the substitution effect. 22 This is supported by the
work done by Ahn and Mira, who have shown that after an initial drop in fertility rates upon
female entry to the work force, fertility rates correlate positively with female workforce
participation, and thus, female pay.23 Thus, the more money a woman makes, the more likely
she is to have children. An obstacle to the income effect is the global persistence of a gender
gap in pay. Worldwide, male employees tend to be paid more than female employees for the
same or equal work.24 The gap is smaller between unmarried, non-mothers and their male
colleagues, and larger between married mothers and their male colleagues. According to
Rainald Borck, “fertility, female labor force participation and childcare provision are positively
correlated with each other, while the gender wage gap seems to be negatively correlated with
these variables.”25 Meaning, the closer to wage parity women are, the more women
participate in the labor force, and the more children women have. Thus, a nation with a low
20

Ibid.

21

Orsal, D. D., & Goldstein, J. R. (2010, April). “The increasing importance of economic conditions on fertility.” In
annual meetings of the Population Association of America. Dallas, Texas, April (pp. 15-17).
22

Ibid.

Ahn, N., & Mira, P. (2002). “A note on the changing relationship between fertility and female employment rates
in developed countries.” Journal of Population Economics, 15(4), 667-682.
23

In 2014 President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order preventing retaliation against employees for
initiating wage discrimination law suits. This order applies to government contractors, and is aimed at lowering the
wage gap in the United States, where on average women earn 77 cents for every 1 dollar a man makes.
24

Borck, R. (2014). “Adieu Rabenmutter—culture, fertility, female labour supply, the gender wage gap and
childcare.” Journal of Population Economics, 1-27.
25
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female labor participation rate and a high wage gap will have more women opting not to have
children, while a nation with a high labor participation rate and low wage gap will have a higher
number of women opting to have children.
Wide spread youth unemployment also has an impact on fertility, as it impacts the
acquisition of monetary resources at a young age, and prevents young adults from acquiring
the necessary capital required for family formation.26 This pushes back the age of first child
birth, and greatly decreases the number of possible children to be born to a particular couple. 27
According to a recent paper headed by Goldstein, fertility rates amongst the youth are
particularly affected by unemployment as, “young people can more easily revise their fertility
plans.”28 This reduces the number of children a couple may have. This is compounded by late
entry into the labor force or entry into the labor force during a recession, which correlates to
lower wages across the career of the individual.29 Lower wages and lower income correlates to
a lower fertility rate. Another emerging area of research in regards to fertility rates is the role
of underemployment. Underemployment is employment at the part time level, despite a
desire to work full time and with the qualifications to work a much more skilled job. Those in
underemployment, including temporary workers, are engaged in work that is low paying and
with low stability. For instance, Japanese temporary workers are paid as little as one third of
26

Orsal, D. D., & Goldstein, J. R. (2010, April). “The increasing importance of economic conditions on fertility.” In
annual meetings of the Population Association of America. Dallas, Texas, April (pp. 15-17).
Goldstein, J. R., Kreyenfeld, M., Jasilioniene, A., & Örsal, D. K. (2013).” Fertility reactions to the" Great Recession"
in Europe: Recent evidence from order-specific data.” Demographic Research, 29.
27

28
29

Ibid.

Djernaes, L. (2013). “ A Nordic perspective on youth unemployment.” Life Long Learning In Europe, (1),
Retrieved from http://www.lline.fi/en/article/policy/20134/a-nordic-perspective-on-youth-unemployment
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that of their full time colleagues.30 As higher wages are correlated with higher fertility, a nation
with large numbers of part time and temporary workers will be more likely to have a low
fertility rate, as many women and couples will decide that it is not financially wise to bear
children.
Another economic issue that has been pin pointed as influencing fertility is recession.
Current thought is that fertility rates are higher in good economic conditions than in poor
economic times, as children are an economic risk in industrialized nations, not an investment as
they are in less developed nations.31 This was confirmed by recent research by Goldstein et all,
which indicates that there is a strong correlation between recession and decreased fertility.32
They state uncertain economic climate leads individuals to delay fertility activity. As a result,
the fertility rate of a nation in which there is a severe recession or with limited economic
opportunities will be lower than that of a nation in which there has been no large scale
economic issue or extensive economic exclusion.
The Economic metric will be operating under three assumptions. First, that
unemployment, particularly female unemployment, leads to low fertility. In addition to this
focus on women, youth unemployment is also an indicator of a low fertility rate. Second, the
income effect: that women will have more children when their pay is higher. Thusly, a high
30

Sanders, S. & Yamamoto, C. (November 15, 2013). “ Increasing temporary employment in japan: polarization in
the labor market and the ‘working poor”” Lexology, Retrieved from
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=41dd48d3-7af8-4cc0-8972-92971050569c.
31

Orsal, D. D., & Goldstein, J. R. (2010, April). “The increasing importance of economic conditions on fertility.” In
annual meetings of the Population Association of America. Dallas, Texas, April (pp. 15-17).
32

Goldstein, J. R., Kreyenfeld, M., Jasilioniene, A., & Örsal, D. K. (2013). “Fertility reactions to the" Great Recession"
in Europe: Recent evidence from order-specific data.” Demographic Research, 29.
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wage gap between genders would be indicative of a nation with low fertility. Thirdly, recession,
as recession can exacerbate or precipitate high rates of unemployment, underemployment, and
economic uncertainty.

B. Maternal Support Structures
Maternal support structures are programs and entitlements created by the government
in order to reduce the burden of bearing and raising children in a modern society, and to induce
women to have more children by providing programs that allow them to remain in the
workforce. Maternal support structures include issues such as day care, maternal leave,
prenatal care, and general social welfare aid. The creation of these policies is often the first
step a nation takes in fixing the low fertility rate of a nation. Some of these structures are very
common. The structures vary in the amount of funding, the extent of the aid, and the scope of
the mission of the program. It is in these differences in which the support structures of a
positive or negative reproductive climate will be found.
Maternity and family leave policies are a major part of most industrialized nation’s
maternal support structure. These policies allow for pregnant and post-partum women to take
time off before and after the birth of their child to give birth, recover, and care for their
newborns. The time given to mothers ranges from 6 weeks in the United States, to up to a year
in Norway, Japan and Italy. In addition to time given, many nations also include some form of
pay during the leave period, in an effort to negate the monetary effect of taking leave on the
woman or couple. The amount that is paid depends on the nation, as does the source of the
funds. Paid maternal leave is provided by all but four countries: Papua New Guinea, Swaziland,

14
Lesotho, and the United States of America. One factor that is very important in regards to
these policies is the protection of women against employment discrimination. In countries with
weak anti-discrimination laws, soon to be mothers are often forced out of the workforce. For
instance, in Italy it was once routine for women to be forced to resign once they revealed that
they were pregnant.33
While leave policies are routinely targeted at women, paternity leave policies are also
becoming popular. Father’s typically get as little as two weeks, but some nations allow for
twelve weeks of paternal leave or more.34 According to Duvander and Andersson there is a,
“positive effect of a father’s moderately long leave on a couple’s second and third-birth
propensity.”35 This means that in nations with paternal leave policies there is a higher
likelihood of couples having multiple children. However, this is dependent on men actually
using the paternal leave they are entitled to. Many men do not take paternity leave, as they
fear it will negatively impact their career. For instance, according to a recent study by the
Center for Work and Family at Boston college, 16% of new fathers are unable to take any days
off upon the birth of a new child.36 The situation is similar in Japan and Italy, where men are
afforded only 2 weeks of paternity leave. According to the Japan Times, “more than 1 in 10
Cooper, M. (2013, April 4). “Meet the Italian women fighting to be more than mothers and lovers.” The
Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/9968817/Meet-the-Italian-womenfighting-to-be-more-than-mothers-and-lovers.html.
33

Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, (2012). Equality 2014 – the Norwegian government’s gender
equality action plan. Retrieved from Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion.
34

Duvander, A. Z., & Andersson, G. (2006). “Gender equality and fertility in Sweden: A study on the impact of the
father's uptake of parental leave on continued childbearing.” Marriage & Family Review, 39(1-2), 121-142.
35
36

Harrington, B., Van Deusen, F., & Humberd, B. (2011). “The new dad: Caring, committed and conflicted.” Boston
College Center for Work and Family, Boston, MA.
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working men have experienced ‘paternity harassment.’”37 Paternity harassment includes being
denied the option to take leave, being told that taking leave will harm ones career, and being
harassed upon return from leave. As a result, only 2.6 percent of men with new children take
paternal leave in Japan.38 In contrast, Norwegian men are given 12 weeks of paternity leave,
with nine out of ten men taking leave.39 An increase in men taking paternity leave normalizes
workers taking time to care for children, regardless of gender. As such, paternity leave helps to
increase the fertility rate by reducing the childcare penalty women take in their careers.40
Paternity leave, thus is an indicator of a positive reproductive climate. 41
Another form of support is the baby bonus. The baby bonus is a cash payment to the
parents of a newborn, meant to cover some of the expense of raising a new child. This cash
payment varies in size and distribution method. Some nations even give a monthly stipend to
couples with children under a certain age. Japan, Italy and Australia all use the baby bonus
system, but it is not without controversy. Australia was able to use the baby bonus to some
success, as the nation did get a modest boost in fertility after the initial implementation of the
baby bonus, many critics point out that the cost of the bonuses could be better spent in other
Otake, T. (2014, January 24). “Over 1 in 10 men have experienced ‘paternity harassment’: survey.” The Japan
Times. Retrieved from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/24/national/paternity-leave-harassmentrevealed-in-union-survey/
37

38

Ibid.

39

Benhold, K. (2011, June 28). “Working Women are the Key to Norway's Prosperity.” New York Times. Retrieved
April 20, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/world/europe/29ihtletter29.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
40

Rindfuss, R. R., Guilkey, D. K., Morgan, S. P., & Kravdal, Ø. (2010). “Child‐Care Availability and Fertility in Norway.
Population and development review,” 36(4), 725-748.
41

Paternity leave remains controversial in many nations. In March 2014 Boomer Esiason criticized Mets player
Daniel Murphy for missing two games to be with his wife and new baby. Esiason’s criticism sparked a debate
about paternity leave in the United States.
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reforms.42 Italy and Japan have also implemented baby bonuses, and any bump they may have
is similarly modest. The baby bonus is often more politically problematic than policy sound.
Many women see the bonus as insulting, and feel that it ignores the realities of caring for
children in industrialized nations.43 This is especially true of young women or women who are
unemployed. A onetime cash payment may be helpful to a middle or upper class couple, but to
a poor couple the cash payment does little to make the cost of caring for a childless expensive.
Japan, Italy, Singapore and many other low fertility nations employ the baby bonus. But high
fertility nations such as Norway do not.
Thus, the use of the baby bonus system could be seen as a symptom of a nation in which there
is a negative reproductive climate as it shows the government is not as in tune with the needs
of working mothers and families as it could be.
In addition, it is shown that programs that help women stay in the workforce and help
to mitigate the loss of income during leave or early child hood also helps to prop up fertility.44
This includes maternity leave, especially maternity leave in which couples are entitled to a
portion of pay while on leave. While on the surface this may seem cost ineffective, compared
to the cost of infant care within the confines of child care institutions this is a net benefit, as
children do not enter the system until they have somewhat less of a demanding care giver to
child ratio.
Programs that allow for women to remain in the workforce can help women who are
undecided on having children to feel more comfortable doing so. One of the programs that is
42
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highly correlated with higher fertility rates is cheap, plentiful options for childcare. As more
women join the workforce, it is increasingly important that there are alternative care options
for young children, as their mothers are busy in the work place. One study posits that the
availability is very important in increasing fertility rates, citing a tenth of a percent increase in
the fertility rate for every ten percent of children in day care.45 The existence of daycare does
not simply increase the fertility rate, however. The cost of daycare is often one factor that
forces women out of the workforce, thus decreasing the fertility rate of the nation as women
opt to have none or fewer children to lessen the opportunity costs associated with childcare.
Many nations thus subsidize the cost of daycare to some extent, and offer early childhood
education programs. Not only must the cost be taken into account, but the operating hours as
well. A daycare that operates under typical working hours will be significantly less useful than
one that is open before and after normal commute times. In the examination of child care, the
cost, availability and hours open must be accounted for, as child care that in unaffordable, hard
to obtain and has hours that do not work with the needs of working parents is not as effective
in raising the fertility rate as ones that are cheap, widely available, and with flexible schedules
that allow for early drop off and late pick up.
This metric will operate under the following assumptions: maternity leave with some
form of compensation during that time is a global norm. But, that same leave with no legal or
social protections can dissuade women from having children. Paternity leave that men actually
take is a sign of healthy fertility. Cheap, plentiful, daycare with operating hours that are
44
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appropriate to working hours is a fertility positive. There is a strong correlation between the
availability of childcare and the fertility rate of a nation, as mothers do not have to make a
choice between continuing to work and having a deficit income because of day care, and
staying home to care for children to save money despite a desire to work. Baby bonuses and
other cash payments do some to ameliorate the cost of caring for a child, but often signify
single issue thinking and a low fertility society.

C. Family and Societal Expectations
The final metric chosen is ‘family and social expectations.’ If ‘maternal support
structures’ is de jure support for mothers, family and social expectations is the de facto support
for mothers and women who might become mothers. Traditionally, women were expected to
be the caretakers of the home and any children in the family. Men were expected to earn all or
most of the money, and did very little childcare or chores. But, as women’s education rates
have risen, more and more women wish to enter the workforce. This has created a tension
between traditional ideas of womanhood and motherhood that has led many women to
question whether or not to have children at all.
According to Adsera, countries with low female workplace participation have fewer
children, and this lower participation is often due to societal expectations of motherhood.46
Women in low workforce participation countries were historically expected to drop out of the
workforce after a short term in order to care for children and run the household. But as
45
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women have gained more education, and have desired to or have been compelled to enter the
workforce, many wish to stay. In countries where women are expected to leave the workforce
after marriage or having children, women may be routinely discriminated against in
employment. This discrimination may manifest itself as a high female unemployment rate, or
as intense pressure from managers and colleagues to leave the workforce after a woman has a
child. Often corporate and government structures have not adapted to the change, and neither
have social mores. Thus, women find themselves making a choice between parenthood and
employment, and many times employment wins.
In addition to this fact, family structure and gender roles within the society may also
play a role in whether or not women desire to marry and have children. In countries that
maintain traditional gender roles, “ marriage typically entails either a reduction in market
employment or a burdensome ‘second shift.’”47 This decreases the appeal of marriage to many
women, and in many societies, the appeal of motherhood as well. In highly gender unequal
societies, the rate of childbirth outside of marriage is very small. In Japan for instance, only 1.6
percent of children are born out of wedlock.48 This means that children are highly correlated
with marriage. If women do not feel that there will be equality within marriage, it will often be
avoided. The second shift, as well as pay that does not make up for the cost of child care, is one
of the many reasons women find themselves forced out of the workforce. Housework and
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involvement in the home life by the father also plays a significant role in whether or not a
woman will have more than one child. Couples in which there is low involvement and little to
no help with chores by the father tend to have fewer children than couples in which both
parents take an equal role in parenting.49 This is especially true of nations with highly
traditional ideas of marriage and family. According to a study by Cooke, a second child was
more likely to be born to an Italian couple if the man was more involved around the house and
with childcare.50 In gender unequal societies, while a couple may decide to choose to have one
child, if the primary burden of childcare and housework falls on the woman, the couple will
have fewer children. Still more women may simply opt out of marriage and family in order to
pursue a career.
The major theory of the Societal and Family expectation metric is that gender equality,
both in the home and the workplace, increases the fertility of a nation. This is done by first by
making women less fearful of losing employment after pregnancy, which increases primary
fertility. This is accomplished secondly by reducing the workload women face in the home by
increasing the amount of chores and childcare that men do in the home. This increases the
chances of secondary and tertiary fertility, thus increasing the overall fertility rate.
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Chapter 3 Case Studies
This chapter will cover the different nations involved in the study. As such, the chapter
will be divided into three parts, containing four sections each. The first part of each case will
contain a brief overview of the nation and its demographics. This will give a complete picture of
the situation of the nation. The next three sections will cover each of the metrics involved in
the study: the economy, maternal support structures, and societal and family expectations. At
the end of each case study there will be a final analysis of the reproductive climate as a whole,
taking into account the theories incorporated into the metrics discussed in the previous section.

1. Japan
Japan, with a fertility rate of 1.4 births per woman, is one of the nations most concerned
with the issue of demographic change51. This is due in great part to its increasingly aging
population, and also due to Japan’s reluctance to admit foreign workers. Japan is a highly
homogenous society, with less than 1.5% of the population being members of minority groups
or foreign workers.52As a result of these factors, almost half of Japan’s population of
127,103,388 is over the age of 55.53 As shown in the population pyramid below, this
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arrangement is unsustainable. The increasingly smaller generations have to support large

Figure 1 Japan's Population Pyramid54
numbers of elderly individuals, with a shrinking tax base.
In addition to the top heavy population, it the low fertility rate and population decline
has already been underway for almost forty years. This low, sustained birthrate will make it
difficult for Japan to fund pension systems, provide elder care, and eventually balance the
government books altogether. The Japanese government is understandably worried, and has
pushed women to have more children. These efforts have ranged from offering baby bonuses,
which are payments to women upon the birth of each child, to subsidized day care. But,
The World Fact Book, 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
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Japan’s birthrate remains low, and Japan maintains the dubious status of worst nation for
working mothers.55 The metrics in the study help to explain why Japan has earned this “honor.”

A. The Economy
The Japanese economy and labor market has been in a state of recession or recovery for
the past twenty four years. During that time, the fertility rate has been in a state of constant
decline. This state of economic malaise combined with a structurally inflexible labor market
and institutionalized ageism and sexism has had a depressive effect on the fertility rate.

Figure 2 Japanese Fertility Rate Over Time56
In the 1990s, the asset bubble burst in Japan, sending Japan into a period, “of deflation
and recession [during which] growth slowed down and sometimes became even negative.”57
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This crash has created an economic malaise that has become known as “The Lost Decade” and
is occasionally expanded into “The Lost Decades.” As shown by the figure below, the Japanese
fertility rate had already been in decline before the 1990s, but the Lost Decade caused a drastic
decline in the number of births per woman from which Japan has not recovered. Also of
interest is the early drop of the fertility rate to below replacement levels in the mid 1960’s, and
the small boom in the 1980s. The former correlates to a period of economic trouble, and the
latter to a period of economic boom.
This is partially due to the general economic climate and the relationship between low
fertility rates and a poor economy.58 But, there is also a compounding factor that has
magnified the effect of the Lost Decade. This factor is the inflexible labor market that has
evolved into a system that excludes young people from the stable jobs and salaries that allow
for the formation of families.
In the Lost Decade, the traditional system of shūshīn koyō, or lifelong employment, was
shown to be unsustainable in poor economic times. Lifetime employment is a system of long
term, stable employment characterized by hiring straight out of school, and remaining at the
company until marriage(in the case of women) or retirement. 59 Due to the inflexible nature of
such labor contracts, during the Lost Decades hiring slowed. And, in a culture that values
inexperience and youth in its entry level employees, this meant that many young men and
women found themselves permanently excluded from the permanent labor market. Some of
58
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these young people became classified as NEETS (not in education, employment or training). 60
As of 2002, there were about 650,000 to 850,000 NEETS in Japan, and the trend will continue to
worsen as “Freeters and NEETs at present are men and unmarried women between the ages of
15 and 34, a group that has been aging with the general population.”61 This is an ongoing
problem that will continue to be compounded with time as, “in 1992, 60% of NEETs fell within
the age ranges of 15 to 24, but in 1997 60% fell within the age ranges of 20 to 29, and in 2002
60% fell within the age ranges of 25 to 34.”62 This shows that the original NEETS were unable
to enter the work force, and as an extension, were unable to marry and become parents.
NEETs are not the only individuals who are precluded from parenthood by employment
issues. As a response to the problems of rigid employment practices, the Japanese government
loosened restrictions on temporary workers. Initially tem jobs were limited via, “the
method …of the ‘open list,’ whereby covered jobs were listed.”63 However, due to increasing
economic pressure, the law was eventually changed in 1999, to list the jobs temporary workers
could not do. As such, “ Temporary work also nearly doubled, rising from 20% in 1990 to 34%
in 2008”.64 Compounding this issue, is that manufacturing workers could only be hired on 3
year temp contracts and, “professional workers sent by manpower agencies, including
secretaries and interpreters, working on a temporary basis [were] authorized without
60
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specifying the length of service.”65 This means that office workers could theoretically work for
the same company for many years as a temporary worker, while working the same hours and
with the same responsibilities as a full time worker, but without the protection, pension, pay or
benefits as a full time employee. Indeed, “the average salary of regular workers is 3,170,000
yen and the average salary of temporary workers is 1,964,000 yen.”66 Essentially, a temporary
worker is paid only a fraction of what a full time worker is paid.67 Not only that, but, “[in 2004]
the Unemployment Insurance Law was modified and unemployment benefits were made more
difficult to obtain for dispatched workers.”68 Temporary workers are also in a state of uncertain
employment as, “The employment of permanent workers [is] more protected than that of
temporary workers…permanent workers can be more easily motivated to accumulate firmspecific skill than workers, resulting in relative efficiency superiority in permanent workers.” 69
This instability is not just limited to young graduates. Japanese companies prefer to hire new
workers straight out of high school or college, and there are very few open positions in middle
management. As a result, once an individual becomes a temporary worker, it is unlikely that he
or she will ever obtain a full time position. As this population grows, a larger percentage of the
64
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population will suffer from low wage, low stability jobs that are not conducive to marriage and
children.

B. Maternal Support Structures
If a woman can obtain a job and find someone to marry, things do not get much better.
Japan has been called one of the worst developed nations for working mothers.70 Part of this is
workplace discrimination, which will be explored in more depth in the next section; another
part of this is inadequate day care and support for working mothers. Japan, like most other
industrialized nations, has created a host of programs to help ameliorate the time and money
demands of having children. Like most developed countries, Japan has paid maternity leave,
with the first 8 weeks paid at 67% of pay, and after that they get 50% of pay for up to a year.71
Men receive parental leave as well, but only 2.63% of men take it. 72 Many women do not take
the leave, and instead choose to leave the workforce entirely. Or, if they do return to work,
they find themselves pushed out of the workforce. As a result, “70% of Japanese women leave
the workforce after having their first child.”73
There are several reasons for this. One is the daycare shortage in Japan. Known as
hokatsu, the search for day care in Japan is now considered a task as difficult as getting into a
70
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top university.74 This is due to a severe day care shortage at both the public, subsidized level,
and also the private. Tokyo alone is 25,000 public daycare slots short of demand.75 This leaves
women to search for slots in the private day care system, which can be prohibitively
expensive.76 Not that the public system is any cheaper, with care for a first child costing 70,000
Yen ($737, £484) per month.77 And private options are even more expensive.
The often discussed ‘baby bonus’ Japan offers its mothers does little to mitigate the cost
of raising and bearing children in Japan. Japan pays women 500,000 yen, about $5,000, upon
the birth of a child.78 As of 2009, Japan also offered cash payments to parents, which amount
to about $3,400 USD per year.79 Often the lump sum simply covers the hospital visit and
birth.80 The bonus seems to have little effect on a woman’s choice to have a child, and serves

more to insult women than to encourage women to marry and become mothers.81 The baby
bonus seems to many a poor solution to the reasons women choose not to have children such
as, “the high cost of education, the lack of day care, the scarcity of decent or affordable housing

74

Tobuchi, H. (2013, February 26). “Desperate hunt for day care in Japan.” The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/world/asia/japans-mothers-in-hokatsu-hunt-forday-care.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
75

Ibid.

76

Wingfield-Hayes, R. (2013, March 21). Japan: The worst developed country for working mothers? BBC News.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21880124.
77

Ibid.

78

Weisman, S. R. (1991). “In crowded japan, a bonus for babies angers women.”

Lah, K. (2009, February 4). “Plan would pay Japanese families to have kids”. CNN.com. . Retrieved May 1, 2014,
from http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/09/04/japan.children/index.html.
79
80

Suzuki, T. (2009). “Fertility decline and governmental interventions in Eastern Asian advanced countries.” The
Japanese Journal of Population, 7(1), 47-56.

29
and the physical and emotional burdens of raising children when their husbands work from
early morning until they stagger home on the last subway train toward midnight.” 82

C. Societal and Family Expectations
The arguments against the baby bonus hint at one of the major reasons Japanese
women are forgoing marriage and motherhood entirely. The lack of equality in both the
workplace and the home has many women feeling forced to choose between starting a family
and continuing their careers- and many women are choosing the workplace. Japan’s highly
traditional society has a major impact on this choice. Despite some gains by the Japanese
feminist movement in the 1980s, women still routinely find themselves engaged in lower
paying part time work or in career paths at work that are largely support and secretarial. In the
home, the traditional roles of male bread winner and female home maker remain strong. One
woman stated that her reason for not marrying her long term boyfriend is that, “He was a
typical Japanese man. He didn't want a partner, he wanted me to be his mother.”83 As
marriage and childbearing are strongly correlated in Japan, this disconnect between what the
two sexes want means a lower fertility rate for an already struggling Japan.
Women who have children and choose to remain at work not only face the daunting
task of finding day care, but also face the disapproval and resentment of colleagues and
employers. In fact, “49% of Japanese mothers left (their jobs) because they felt stymied and
81
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stalled” in their current positions.84 Others say that, “they’re pushed off the career track by
unsupportive work environments and managers who do not value them.” 85 Managers aren’t
the only source of pressure. Colleagues also provide a push out of the door, and are often
hostile to women who have to leave early to pick up children from childcare. 86 In addition to
pressure from colleagues, many women simply do not see the point of staying in a position
where they are not paid what their work is worth as “the wages of women in Japan, as in other
advanced economies, are considerably less than those received by male workers, and in fact
the wages of women in Japan are notoriously low.”87 According to the Japan Times, Japanese
working mothers only make 61% of what their male colleagues make.88 The overall gap
between men and women is 29%.89. As a result, Japan has the second highest gender gap in
pay in the world.90 This is also partially due to the large number of women who are engaged in
temporary work.91 Women who are pushed out of the work force often return after a few years
84
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spent raising children, and these women are relegated to low paying, unstable temporary work
that leads to little advancement.92
The problems do not only come from the workplace. In Japan, motherhood is highly
correlated with marriage, with the number of non-martial births in Japan at only 1.6 percent.93
This low number of out of wedlock births means that the choice of partner heavily influences
the decision to have children. Many Japanese however, do not intend to ever marry, and those
that do are marrying at later and later ages, reducing the number of fertile years within
marriage.94 The young woman mentioned earlier is not alone in finding the role of Japanese
wife and mother undesirable, and as a result the marriage rates are falling. According to Japan,
“33.5% of Japanese thing marriage is pointless.”95 Those under the age of thirty were most
likely to view marriage as a pointless exercise, and this distaste for marriage impacts the fertility
rate.96
For women, this is largely due to the great rift of inequality and responsibility within the
home. For many women, marriage, and later children, means working a second shift of
housework, childcare and eldercare once the official work day is done. 97 Though many men say
that working mothers are fine, these same men do not follow through with the home support
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to make it happen.98 Japanese men spend only one hour a day helping with chores, and only
fifteen minutes a day caring for their own children. 99 This places the primary burden of
housework and childcare on Japanese women, who often find themselves functioning in the
role of a single parent, but with the luxury of a spouse who brings home a paycheck. Many
young Japanese do not find this system to be appealing, and so avoid the institution of marriage
entirely. This opting out of marriage and children has led to Japan’s singles society, and
depressed the fertility rate even further. The lack of gender equality in the home is thus a
major factor in the low fertility rate of the nation.

D. Reproductive Climate
The overall reproductive climate of Japan is very poor. The poor economy, ridged labor
structure, and the exclusion of young people and women from the fulltime, stable workforce
leads many to forgo marriage and children because of the cost. This matches the previously
discussed theories that a strong economy, equal pay, and economic opportunity lead to fertility.
Those that do desire to have children are discouraged by the lack of childcare. This lack of child
care matches the previously stated theory that the more childcare that is available, the higher
the fertility rate will be, there is a one tenth of a percent jump in fertility rate for each ten
percent of children in childcare under the age of 5.
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environment in which the highly educated women of Japan choose to forgo marriage and
children in favor of a career.101 The forced differentiation and the heavy reliance on the unpaid
labor of women in Japan is thus a major factor in the continued low birth rate of Japan, and will
remain so unless the structural issues and gender bias within the society are resolved. The
resolution of some of these issues may lead to an increase in the fertility rate and the economy,
due to the intertwining nature of the reproductive climate. By simply increasing the availability
of stable, semi-permanent jobs in Japan and correcting the massive abuse of temporary
workers within Japan, many young people may see the climate as safe to bear children in.
Without major change, Japan will have yet another generation that does not reach replacement
rate.

2. Italy
Italy is a southern European nation with a population of 61,680,122.102 Italy has one of the
lowest total fertility rates in Europe, at 1.42 births per woman. 103 As shown by the figure below,
there are an increasingly smaller number of children and young adults available to support a
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large number of elderly individuals, and this will only worsen as the middle aged reach
retirement age.104

Figure 3 Italy Population Pyramid105
What makes this low fertility particularly remarkable is the religiosity of Italy. Italy is
primarily a Catholic nation, and one of its neighbors is Vatican City, the home of the Pope and
the center of Catholic though and faith. That the fertility rate has declined to such an extent
despite Catholic teachings against birth control is truly remarkable. Italy has been dealing with
the possibility of significant population decline for less time than Japan, but the issue is no less
dangerous. Without significant effort to increase the fertility rate in the next few decades, Italy
will face significant obstacles to increasing fertility. Luckily, Italy has suffered from the problem
of low fertility for less time than the nation of Japan, with the fertility decline only occurring in
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the past generation. Improving a one generation fertility shortfall will be significantly easier
than repairing a two or even three generation fertility gap.

A. Economy
The Italian economy has not grown since it entered the Eurozone in 2000.106 This is
especially troubling as Italy is the only European Union nation that has not grown since the
switch to the Euro in the year 2000.107 This dismal growth is just one symptom of a highly
dysfunctional economy, in which unemployment is rampant. The unemployment rate is at 12.1
percent across the whole population.108 However, the youth unemployment rate is a startling
42%.109
This massive rate of youth unemployment is, just as in Japan, caused by a system of life
time employment that is increasingly becoming inaccessible to young people, who are
increasingly being relegated to low paying, low stability temporary contract jobs, or simply not
hired at all.110 The lifetime employment system in Italy was set up after World War II, and was
designed so a man could support a wife and children on a single, stable salary.111 This model
106

Walker, A. (2014, February 24).” Italy’s economy: The Mountain Matteo Renzi must climb.” BBC News.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26266118.
107

Ibid.

108

Ibid.

109

Davies, L. (2013, June 26). “Italy agrees measures to tackle youth unemployment.” The Guardian.
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/26/italy-youth-unemployment.

110

Povoledo, E. (2012, February 15). “In Italy, facing the end of the lifetime job.” The York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/world/europe/in-italy-facing-the-end-of-the-lifetimejob.html?pagewanted=all.
111

Ibid.

36
was accompanied by stringent labor laws that made it very difficult to fire an employee,
meaning that in recession a company was forced to hold on to employees the corporation could
not afford.112 Like Japan, Italy responded to unemployment and ridged employment structures
by opening up short term temporary work, but just as in the case of Japan, this has just created
a stratification of the work force.113 This has excluded young people from the work place, and
pushed the start of an individual’s career back into the late twenties, and for those who want
children, pushed the age of marriage and birth of the first child back as they cannot afford the
cost of having a child.114 This results in an overall lower fertility for the women who choose to
have children, as they will have fewer childbearing years in which they are actively trying to
conceive and carry a child to term.

B. Maternal Support Structures
Italy has fairly generous maternity leave polices. Pregnant women are required to take
the last two months of their pregnancy and the three months after birth as maternity leave.115
This time is paid at 80 percent of normal pay by their employer, and the remaining twenty
percent is paid by the state. The mother (or rarely father) can choose to then take another six
112

Ibid

113

Ibid.

114

Italian women shun 'mamma' role. (2006, March 27). BBC News. Retrieved from http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4739154.stm.
115

Bohlen, C. (1996, May 12). “The state of welfare in Italy; where every day is mother's day.” The New York
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/12/weekinreview/the-state-of-welfare-initaly-where-every-day-is-mother-s-day.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1.

37
months of leave at thirty percent pay, and then a final three months with no pay.116 In addition
to that, women with risky pregnancies can take the entire pregnancy as leave. 117 Italy has also
instituted a baby bonus, a set amount of money paid to a family after each child’s birth. 118
However, Italy’s support for mothers ends there. The Italian economic system and
welfare system is set up to have men working, with women staying home and caring for the
children.119 This means that there are very few day care centers, or nurseries, available for
working mothers, and those that do exist are prohibitively expensive.120 Some women are
lucky enough to have extended family nearby to care for the children, but many women are
simply pushed out of the workforce. Italy has the second lowest women’s workplace
participation in the European Union, with only 46% of women working.121 This can be partially
attributed to the high numbers of youth unemployment. But it is also due to lack of child care
and discrimination in the work place. Until 2012, some women were forced to pre-sign letters
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of resignation in case they got pregnant.122 The end result is that one third of new mothers
quit their jobs after the birth of their first child. 123
Efforts to raise the Italian fertility rate tend to emphasize the role of the mother in the
home, and remain dependent on the use of unpaid female labor at home. Many municipalities
say that new nurseries are, “too expensive and...[The municipality] has to support the growing
number of older people in the city.”124 This statement highlights one of the major conflicts of
creating supportive systems conducive to childrearing and bearing in a low fertility rate society.
Whether to aid the elderly who currently need help, or to invest in programs designed to
increase the fertility rate, and thus the future available tax base that will help to support the
elderly.

C. Family and Social Expectations
According to the Global Economic Forum, Italy ranks 71 out of 136 countries in global
gender equality, and ranks at number 97 in economic participation. 125 This disparity shows that
there is a great gap between the legal equality of women, and the actual day to day equality. In
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fact, Italy is 124th in the world for equal pay for equal work.126 This great disparity is due to
intense gender discrimination in the work place that allows for women to be paid less than men
for the same work, be less likely to be hired, and to be more likely to engage in part time
employment than full time employment.
In the workplace women face routine discrimination. In hiring, discrimination is
common place, and often, “the first question they ask women [in a job interview] is if they’re
married, have a boyfriend, or what they’re doing in their private life.”127 These questions are to
screen for women who have the possibility of becoming pregnant, and for women who may
have interests and family outside the workplace. If a woman is hired, it was a common practice
until 2012 to have women pre-sign a resignation letter, so that in the event that the woman
becomes pregnant, she can be fired without having to deal with Italy’s strict employment
laws.128 This has resulted in a workplace and society in which are women are forced to choose
between a job and a family.129
This inequality is compounded in the home. Italian women that do manage to find a job.
In Italy, “women work an average of 22 hours in a paid job, in addition to doing 35 hours of
housework each week.”130 Men work eleven hours less, both inside and outside the home.131
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As a result, many women are choosing to marry later, or not marry at all. If they do marry and
choose to have children, they often choose to only have one, as men do not aid in chores..132

D. Reproductive Climate
Italy’s reproductive climate is very poor. Young people and women are routinely
excluded from the workforce, and due to late entry to the work force, shortened fertile years
mean that fewer children are able to be born to a married couple. The economic exclusion of
young people in the workforce correlates with the previously stated theory that unemployment
is correlated with a lower total fertility rate, as individuals will choose to not have children if
there are not sufficient resources to care for them. The gap in pay and economic opportunity is
also consistent with the theories. Women who are affected by a gender gap in pay will often
forgo childbearing as there is an additional ‘mother penalty’ attached to the wages. The
unreliability of contract jobs is also a factor, as stability is desirable in family formation.
Temporary jobs, while not the purgatory they are in Japan, do not allow for the social and
economic security needed for a couple to feel comfortable marrying or having children.
Compounding that is the overall economic climate of Italy, which is one of the worst in the
European Union. Prolonged economic recession has a depressive effect on not only the fertility,
but also on wages, employment, and pay.
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While Italy does have the typical maternal support structures of maternity leave, day
care, and healthcare, there are some major lapses in policy. Italy provides little to no legal
protection against gender and pregnancy discrimination, which has led to a climate of rampant
gender discrimination. This oversight led to practices such as pre-signed resignation letters,
invasive personal questions in job interviews, and a high rate of female unemployment.
Without legal protection, companies will continue to seek to exclude women from the labor
force. For women who are able to get a full time job and return from leave, they face another
hurdle upon return. The availability of day care is very low, and the costs are very high. While
there are some subsidized spots, these go to the low income and the parents of the
developmentally disabled. Women often feel pressured to drop out of the workforce to care
for their children, as their wages do not fully cover the cost of day care. 133 This contributes to
the feeling that women must make a choice between a career and a family. Women may also
face pressure from colleagues and even their own families to drop out of the workforce to care
for children. Women who pursue higher education may opt instead to pursue their careers in
order to utilize their educations, and thus not enter into the institution of marriage.
Italy’s societal and family expectations are very traditional. There is a major gender
equality gap in the workforce, and there is yet another larger one in the home. Italian men do
very little housework in the home, which correlates with a lower possibility of not just marriage,
but also the likelihood of a second or third child in a marriage. Women, who have to not only
care for their children but also their spouse, instead of seeking to address this chore inequality
often opt out of the system of marriage and children altogether. Compounded with low gender
133
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equality over all, and the intense pressure for traditional marriages and gender roles, and
women in Italy are increasingly choosing to lean in to careers. This gap in gender equality
within the home is obviously a major problem, that not only prevents the birth of subsequent
children, but also may impact the number of marriages in Italy as well.

3. Norway
Norway is one of the few industrialized nations that has a birth rate close to replacement rate.
Though Norway is a small nation with a cold, and some times formidable climate, this nation

Figure 4 Norway Population Chart134
has made the news with its emphasis on family life and a balance between home and work for
both men and women. Norway is a medium population country, with 5,147,792 million
people.135 As above, Norway’s population chart is far more even and sustainable than the
moms due to rising costs associated with childcare.
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Japanese chart. The even distribution of the age pyramid shows that the society has the
necessary population at each level to sustain growth for a period of time.
With a fertility rate of 1.95 births per woman, this nation has one of the more stable
populations in Europe.136 Norway is ninety four percent native Norwegian, with a small mix of
immigrants and native minorities.137

A. Economy
Unlike many of its peers, Norway has a relatively stable economy that has managed to
weather the economic crises of the past in few decades. In fact, during the most recent
economic crises, Norway’s economy grew three percent and the government had an eleven
percent budget surplus.138 In comparison, the United States had a deficit of 12.9 percent. 139
This stability is largely attributed to Norway’s unique method of managing the money it
receives from selling oil. All money from oil sales goes into “its sovereign wealth fund, state
money that is used to make investments around the world.” 140 As a result, Norway has built a
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sustainable capital and infrastructure reserve that allows it to mitigate the effect of economic
crises.141
The reason for such a conservative use of the North Sea oil money is the economic
structure of Norway. Norway is a social democracy with not only a strong social safety net, but
also a strong sense of responsibility, “The U.S. and the U.K. have no sense of guilt…. But in
Norway, there is instead a sense of virtue. If you are given a lot, you have a responsibility.”142
The profits from the investment fund thus go into the robust social programs that help to
provide a stable future for Norway, such as education, welfare, health care, and the generous
parental leave packages for which Norway is famous.
Norway’s unemployment is also unusually low, ranging from 3.3 to 3.6 percent. 143 This
is very low compared to the EU, which hovers around eleven percent.144 The youth
unemployment is 8.6 percent.145 But the government is aggressively working to lower that
number as, “young people who do not get attached to the labor market at an early age risk
being permanently excluded.”146 The efforts to employ young people range from income tax
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reductions, subsidies for companies that hire the unemployed, and efforts to better support the
unemployed in job searches.147 The general approach to labor policy is, “Those with an
education should be employed as quickly as possible and those without an education should – if
they are able – start an education as soon as possible.”148 These education efforts and
employment efforts also push for some form of employment or job training during lean times.
These efforts range from worker education programs to ‘practice periods’ in which individuals
work at a company in order to gain experience and connections within a company. 149 The goal
is to have youth unemployed ‘activated’ in the labor market within three months- even in times
of economic strife.150 Norway’s primary bridging program is one in which,” unemployed
persons with reduced work ability and no or limited working experience are offered a two year
full time program aimed at moving them closer to the labor market.” 151 This program helps to
ensure entry to the labor market once economic issues have decreased, and to make the
individual more desirable to employers at the end of the crises.

B. Maternal Support Structures
Norway is special in that it does not have maternal support structures in the traditional sense.
Instead, Norway has a broad program of family support structures, with an emphasis on
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increasing the involvement of fathers.152 These structures include parental leave, subsidized
day care, and subsidized after school care for school aged children. These services were
previously identified as positive indicators of an ideal reproductive climate.
Parental leave is a major portion of the family and parental support structure of Norway.
Norway’s leave policies began in 1956, when it offered twelve weeks to women, and slowly
expanded the benefit as time went on.153 In an effort to mitigate the impact that taking
maternity leave has on a woman’s career, Norway is attempting to normalize men taking leave
as well.154 The couple receives 56 weeks of paid parental leave at eighty six percent of the
couple’s wages.155 Women have nine weeks of mandatory leave pre- and post-birth, and men
have twelve weeks of leave allotted for their exclusive use.156 If a man does not take those
twelve weeks of leave, the woman is unable to use it.157 The remaining thirty five weeks may
be divided as the family chooses. This push for fathers to take leave is working, “as Nine in 10
fathers share parental leave, up from about 2 percent 20 years ago.” 158
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Parents then have access to high quality, subsidized day care starting at the age of one
year.159 If the parents decline to have the child attend day care and instead opt to have a
parent stay home, the family receives a stipend.160 Day care schedules are designed to
accommodate working parents, and thus open early and close late to facilitate commuting
parents.161 The result of this is that seventy five percent of women are in the workforce. 162
There are some private day cares, but they are also subsidized and regulated by the
government, and have sprung up to mitigate a perceived shortage. 163 This massive percentage
of working women is actually considered the key to Norway’s economic success, and the
Norwegian government is not afraid to say so, “ if you can raise female participation, it helps
the economy, birth rates and the budget.”164 It is no accident then, that 90 per cent of
children aged 1-5 attends a childcare center.165 The availability of this childcare has a positive
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effect on the birth rate as, “For each 10 percent increase in child-care availability there is
slightly more than a tenth of a child increase in the average number of children born.” 166
Norway also has an emphasis on work life balance, and a large tradition of flex work
and flex time. The average work week is 35 hours per week, and both men and women opt to
engage in part time work if they so choose.167 Parents also have twenty to thirty days of sick
child leave per year.168 This emphasis on work life balance has created an environment
conducive to family creation, and the emphasis on co-parenting has created an environment in
which women feel comfortable having children.

C. Societal and Family Expectations
In 2008, Norway was named the most gender equal society in the world by the World
Economic forum.169 This is because the Norwegian government has been pushing gender
equality in the home and workplace for some time. The initiatives to create gender equality
165

Cleary, P. (2013, July 15). “Norway is proof that you can have it all.” The Australian. Retrieved from
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/executive-living/norway-is-proof-that-you-can-have-itall/story-e6frg9zo-1226679266322.
166

Rindfuss, R. R., Guilkey, D. K., Morgan, S. P., & Kravdal, Ø. (2010). “Child‐Care Availability and Fertility in
Norway.” Population and development review, 36(4), 725-748.
167

Cleary, P. (2013, July 15). “Norway is proof that you can have it all.” The Australian. Retrieved from
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/executive-living/norway-is-proof-that-you-can-have-it-all/story-e6frg9zo1226679266322.
168

Rindfuss, R. R., Guilkey, D. K., Morgan, S. P., & Kravdal, Ø. (2010). “Child‐Care Availability and Fertility in
Norway.” Population and development review, 36(4), 725-748.
169

“Norway tops gender equality list.” (2008, November 12). BBC News. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7722389.stm.

49
range from the Parental and Family leave packages, to mandating that forty percent of all board
members in a business be female.170 These efforts have had a positive effect.
Norwegian men spend the most time of any men, and spend 180 minutes a day doing
unpaid chores at home, only thirty minutes less than their wives, who do 210 minutes of
chores.171 The amount of housework done by men may in large part be due to the paternity
leave that most men take. This is in comparison to Japanese men, who do the least amount of
housework.172 The penetration of gender equality into the home itself shows that government
efforts to raise the status of women and to create a healthy environment for families in which
both parents contribute is working.
However, Norway has not yet perfect gender equality. But, what makes Norway unique
is that the government is actively working towards that goal. The Norwegian Ministry of
Children, Equality and Social Inclusion releases periodic reports and action plans that outline
the problems related to gender and equality issues and possible methods to correct these
issues.173 The 2014 report outlines ten goals for lessening gender inequality, ranging from
combating gender stereotypes, to balancing gender participation in the labor market( most part
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time workers are women), to ending gender based social violence.174 This Ministry shows that
Norway is keenly aware of gender issues, and is actively working to correct them.

D. Reproductive Climate
The overall reproductive climate is very good in Norway. The stable economy and generous
social programs ensure that no one is excluded from the economy unless an individual chooses
not to work. Work hours are flexible, and an emphasis on productivity rather than presence
creates an atmosphere that is easily mixed with child care duties. Day care is plentiful and
cheap, with long hours to accommodate working parents. Women still engage in part time
work, but in far fewer numbers, and the government is actively trying to equalize the numbers
of male and female part time workers. Norway is trying to reach true gender equality in both
the home and the work place. The Norwegian government offers generous paternity leave,
which most fathers take. Thus, more men are involved at home, and engage in more child care
and house work than average. This reduces the amount of second shift work women do, and
creates an atmosphere in which women and men are equal partners in childcare and rearing.
Norway’s attempts at maintaining the fertility rate and promoting gender equality
within its borders have been successful because of government funding and a genuine desire
on the part of the government to include women and men in both the public and domestic
spheres of the world. Unlike Japan and Italy, who both have underfunded day care systems,
Norway’s day care system is sufficiently funded, large, cheap and open hours that are
conducive to working families. Norway’s emphasis on equality of society makes women feel as
174
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if they are not being penalized for having children, and men being pushed to be involved in
their children’s lives leads to the creation of more second and third born children.
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Chapter 4 Analysis and Rating of Reproductive Climates
By looking at the three case studies, we can see that the two nations with low fertility
rates have many policies and attributes in common with one another. By examining these
similarities alongside the differences between the two low fertility rate nations and the high
fertility rate, we can start to determine some attributes of a nation with a good reproductive
climate. Each metric will be examined in turn, resulting in two general profiles, one of a nation
with a healthy fertility rate, and one with a less stellar fertility rate. These profiles will hopefully
lead to a series of policy prescriptions and ideas that may help low fertility rate countries to
create policies and foster cultural climates that help to incentivize family formation and
encourage couples with existing children to add one or more additional children to their family.

1. Metric Analysis
By examining and comparing the individual metrics, the ideal form of the metric can be
revealed, and a general trend of both positive and negative characteristics can be extrapolated.
These trends will be utilized in the creation of the profiles of the positive and negative
reproductive climates, and will inform policy prescriptions based on the profiles. These metrics
take into account the general theories that were arrived at in Chapter Two, as well as the case
studies and data that were examined in Chapter Three. This analysis of the three nations as well
as the three metrics will help to determine the appropriate characteristics and qualities of the
associated reproductive climates, as well as to highlight some major consistencies and
inconsistencies between the nations.
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A. Economy
There are some surface level similarities and differences that are very important when
discussing the economy. Both Italy and Japan have been in periods of prolonged economic
strife. Japan has been weathering economic trouble for close to twenty years175 and Italy for
over a decade.176 Norway on the other hand has had a relatively stable economy over the past
twenty years, due to investment of North Sea oil money. Norway also benefits from having
more successfully developed programs that seek to ensure stable living conditions even in hard
times, which have not been as effective in Japan and Italy.177
Upon closer inspection, however, we can see larger structural issues that not only
contribute to the low fertility rate, but also contribute to the overall poor state of the
economies in the low fertility rate nations. Both Italy and Japan have unusually high real youth
unemployment rates, with Japan ‘boasting’ an official rate of eight percent178, and Italy with a
youth unemployment rate of 42%.179 While Japan’s official youth unemployment rate is very
low, this supposed strength is in actuality a bookkeeping trick. The massive difference between
those two numbers can be explained by Japan’s extensive use of temporary workers, 45
percent of workers ages 15 to 25 engage in temporary work, and temporary workers make up
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thirty eight percent of Japan’s overall workforce. 180 Italy also has temporary workers, but lacks
the discriminatory elements of the Japanese system in which Japanese temporary workers will
always remain a temporary worker.
Both Italy and Japan have traditions of ‘life time employment,’ in which employees once
hired tend to stay with the company for life. Japan, because of tradition and a preference for
new workers,181 and Italy due to strong labor laws and unions that make it nearly impossible to
fire individuals once hired.182 Both systems of employment functioned well when women
would enter the work force for only a short time before marrying and leaving the workforce.
This provided the necessary elasticity the labor force needed to continue functioning for both
new and veteran workers. When women began to stay, however, Italy and Japan found
themselves with a labor force that would not easily move with economic troubles. Japan
responded to this situation by expanding existing laws regarding temporary workers. This
expansion, coupled with the Japanese preference for fresh graduates, created a permanent
underclass of temporary workers.183 In Italy companies responded by simply not hiring, and as
a result many young people do not start their careers until their late 20s and early 30s. 184
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Both of these systems stand in stark contrast to Norway, which has had a fairly stable
economy thanks to investment of North Sea oil money. Norway also benefits from having a
more flexible attitude towards working, with many Norwegians only working a 35 hour work
week.185 Norway’s robust social service system provides targeted aid to young people during
recessions in the form of a two year work skills program meant to provide new skills and
contacts to young Norwegians attempting to enter the workforce.186 The Norwegian
government aims to have aid to the unemployed within ninety days of job loss or exit from
school.187 The Norwegian government offers these services for a number of reasons, but the
primary driving force is a fear that young people who do not join the economy may be
permanently excluded.188 Compare this with Japan, where due to age discrimination there are
600,000 to 850,000 NEETS who are permanently excluded from the labor market. 189 Norway’s
corporate culture is also more conducive to families. Norwegian companies provide ample flex
time opportunities, and prefer employees who work shorter, more productive hours than those
who work long hours but with low productivity.190 In comparison, Japanese companies
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demand that employee’s stay very late and going home early is considered disloyalty to the
company and can severely impact an employee’s chances at advancement in their chosen
company. 191 This has a depressive effect on the fertility rate, as employees may not have time
to pursue romantic relationships, or later raise their own children.
As evidenced by these case studies, one characteristic of a nation with a healthy fertility
rate is a healthy economy. This has an overall effect of making couples less risk averse, as
children are a major investment in an industrialized nation, and the cost/benefit of having a
child or having an additional child is changed. Another aspect of a nation with a healthy fertility
rate is a path way from school to work, and a way for those who may have missed the chance
to enter the work force during recession to enter once the economic climate improves. This
pathway is incredibly important, as young people with no money to move out, will also have no
money to marry or have children. In addition to a pathway to employment, the jobs available
must be able to support a family, and have the necessary stability that allows for couples to feel
safe making the decision to have children. Long term temp jobs, like those in Japan, offer few
benefits and at one third the salary of a full time job do not offer the pay and stability that is
required.192 Corporate culture must also become more flexible, and allow for a greater work
life balance for workers of all levels of seniority. The idea that longer hours equal more
productivity needs to be changed, and replaced with a culture that values production over face
time.
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B. Maternal Support Structures
There are some similarities between the nations in this study in regards to maternal
support structures. All three have some form of paid parental leave, and have provisions for
extended time off to allow for the care of newborns. All have some form of government
subsidized child care. What differentiate the countries are the degree to which these programs
are successful, and the accessibility of said programs by the families that need them. In low
fertility nations, these services are often inaccessible to the families that would benefit most
from their uses, underfunded, and with too few slots to meet demand. In contrast, similar
services in high fertility nations are much more readily available.
In terms of paid parental leave, all three nations offer leave to some degree, and all
three offer periods of time in which parents receive full or partial pay while caring for their
children. What distinguishes high fertility rate nations from low fertility rate nations is the
degree to which taking parental leave affects the career of the mother. In Norway, both
mothers and fathers are allotted a portion of the parental leave offered by the government. 193
Due to the ‘use it or lose it’ structure of Norway’s leave policies, nine out of ten men take the
twelve weeks of leave they are allotted.194 By having men also take a portion of time off to care
for their children, the Norwegian government reduces the possibility of employment
discrimination against women, as both men and women will take time off to care for children.
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This is in comparison to low fertility nations like Italy and Japan, where employment
discrimination runs rampant. Due to the long periods of maternity leave required by law,
Italian companies are reluctant to hire women. During interviews, it is routine for questions to
be asked about a candidates personal life in an attempt to gauge the likelihood of the candidate
becoming pregnant.195 Until 2012, it was a common practice for firms to have women sign
blank resignation forms in the event the woman became pregnant. 196 In Japan, it is no better;
women are far more likely to be hired as temp works than hired as permanent workers. 197
Additionally, after taking maternity leave most Japanese women are highly likely to experience
resentment push back from their coworkers, who see women who take maternity leave or
leave early to pick up children as not pulling their own weight in the office. 198
All three nations also have some form of government subsidized childcare. However,
Italy and Japan have massive deficits in the number of seats available, as well as very low
subsidies that do not make a significant impact in the cost of day care. In Italy, for instance,
government subsidized day care is typically reserved for the low income or for those whose
children have special needs.199 In Japan, finding a day care slot is so difficult it is compared to
getting into an elite college. The government has a wait list for government run day care, and
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having family in the area makes one less likely to receive a slot.200 Those who do not get a slot
have to turn to the private day care market, which are even more expensive than government
subsidized day care. This lack of access to day care in Italy and Japan ultimately ends up forcing
women out of the workforce to care for their children. In Norway, however, government
subsidized day care is plentiful, and in areas where there are shortages, private day cares spring
up to absorb the excess children.201 Costs are very low, and all children are guaranteed a spot if
their parents choose to send them to care. As a result, ninety percent of children ages 1-5 are
in government sponsored day care in Norway.202
Both low fertility countries have ‘baby bonuses,’ cash payments to parents upon the
birth of a child. These payments are promoted by the government as a means of reducing the
financial impact of having a child. However, the sums given often do nothing more than pay for
the cost of the birth, offering only a short term solution to the long term issue of the cost of
raising a child.203 Women, when polled, also tend to find these sums to be insulting, and feel
that the government is ignoring the difficulty of raising a child in modern society.204
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As shown by the case studies, the most successful ‘maternal support structures’ are
ones that are not simply aimed at women. The Norwegian family leave program pushes for the
involvement of both parents, and lessens the discrimination working mothers face by spreading
the burden of child care to both parents. The two low birth rate nations still perceive childcare
to be primarily the unpaid work of women, and thus the government supports are aimed at
women, but are underfunded, as there is still a lingering sense that women should be at home,
and not working. However, this attitude is shown to be a cause of low fertility, as women,
when given the choice between a family and a career, are opting to have a career instead. In
Norway, however, where motherhood and working are compatible, the fertility rate is much
higher. There is actually a statistical connection between the availability of daycare and the
fertility rate of a nation. For every 10% of children ages 1-5 in daycare, there is a tenth of a
point jump in fertility.205 If low fertility rate nations wish to raise fertility rates, they must
increase support for working mothers and fathers.

C. Social and Family expectations
In this metric there is once again a divide between the two low fertility nations and the
high fertility nation. The low fertility nations have very low gender equality for an industrialized
nation, while the high fertility nation ranks among the best in the world for gender equality.
Italy is number 71 out of 136, and Japan is number 105 out of 136. 206 Norway is number 3 in
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the world for gender equality.207 This gap in gender equality is caused by many things that may
affect the choice to have a child, such as ability to work after having children, payment, and the
involvement of fathers in the home.
In low fertility nations, there is considerable inequality in the workplace for women.
They are routinely paid less than their male counterparts are, and are more likely to engage in
temporary or part time work than their male counter parts. Italy for instance is 124th in the
world for equal pay for equal work. Norway, in contrast, is ranked number 9 in the world for
equal pay for equal work.208 This gap is further compounded by the increased likelihood that
women will engage in part time, rather than full time work. Low wages may contribute to
women leaving the workforce, as families may make the decision that the cost of childcare is
more than the pay received by the woman, and decide it is best for the woman to leave the
work force.
Another major difference between the low fertility nations and the high fertility nation
is the involvement of the father in household chores and the amounts of ‘second shift’ work
that working mothers are expected to do. In Japan, men do very little housework and child care,
spending as little as one hour a day on chores and fifteen minutes a day with their own
children.209 When taking into account paid and unpaid labor, Italian men do eleven hours less
work total than their female counterparts.210 Norwegian men on the other hand spend 180
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minutes a day doing housework, only thirty minutes less than their wives. 211 This involvement
helps to alleviate the perceived burden of housework and childcare on mothers.
What sets the high fertility nation apart from the low fertility nation is the government
emphasis on the equality of women both in the work place and the home, and the government
programs meant to ensure a gender equal society. Norway has a ministry dedicated to equality
and social inclusion, which releases periodic reports on the state of equality within Norway, and
what policies should be pursued to increase equality within the nation. 212 Norwegian family
policies work toward the total inclusion of women in the work place, and consider both parents
to have an equal role in raising children. Italian and Japanese family programs still operate on
the assumption that women will be the primary caregivers at home, and thus ignore the
problems that working mothers face.

2. Climate Profiles
Below are the profiles of both the negative and positive reproductive climates. By studying the
metrics above, some trends regarding the characteristics of both positive and negative
reproductive climates can be discovered. By creating these profiles, a general set of policy
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prescriptions and initiatives can be created with the end goal of transforming negative
reproductive climates into positive ones.

A. Positive Reproductive Profile
High fertility rate nations have strong economies and social safety nets. Youth
unemployment is low, and there are programs to help young people obtain employment or
training during difficult economic times. Temporary work is not an obstacle to employment
later in life, and education is cheap and plentiful. Corporate structures are more flexible and
adaptable to poor economic conditions. While corporations do employ temporary workers,
these workers are not semi-permanent temporary workers with the responsibilities of a full
timer but with the pay of a part timer. While women do also participate in temporary and part
time work, it is easier for them to move into permanent work when they desire to than it is in
low fertility countries. Often, the government will see a gap in the number of part time male
and female workers as a problem, and seek to lessen the gap and increase the incentive for
women to work full time. Laws regarding discrimination based on gender, marital or family
status exists and are enforced. Working hours are reasonable, and corporations understand
that workers have outside responsibilities. Often, they will offer sick days that are earmarked
for the care of ill children.
Parental leave is given to both parents, so the impact of taking time off to care for
children is mitigated. Fathers know about, and routinely take parental leave to care for new
children. There is little to no discrimination or harassment of men who take time to care for
children. In some cases, it is actively encouraged by the government. This leave is paid at some
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percentage of the couple’s income, and is protected by law. The length of the leave varies, but
it is typically fairly generous. Childcare is plentiful and cheap, and offers drop of and pick up
times that are convenient for working parents. This childcare is often subsidized by the
government to keep costs down, and costs are further suppressed by having extended parental
leave policies, which allow for parents to care for infants (who require a smaller staff to child
ratio). Education is cheap, quality, and widely available, and is complemented with after care
programs to allow for parents to work.
Women have near pay equity. Men do their share of the household chores, and are
equal parents with their wives. Women are not the default caregiver of children, and both men
and women are encouraged to take time off to care for children. Sick days for the use of caring
for ill children are also given. The government sees women as not just a means of reproduction,
but as a means of production in the workforce. Children are seen as a compliment to life, not
an obstacle in the career path. Marriage and children are not highly correlated, but women are
less likely to see husbands and children as a burden and more likely to see them in a positive
light. Governments view the issue of choosing to have a child as a complex, interdisciplinary
issue that both women and men make, and attempt to make the process of creating and raising
a child compatible with working. Gender equality is high, with women seen in all levels of
public life.

B. Negative Reproductive Profile
Low fertility rate nations share several characteristics that distinguish them from higher
fertility rate nations. They have poor economies with high youth unemployment rates; they
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have inflexible corporate structures that react poorly to recession. In some cases, this
inflexibility causes a hiring freeze, and in extreme cases those unable to find employment early
in adulthood are unlikely to ever obtain a full time job. As companies in nations with negative
reproductive climates traditionally relied on young women as a source of temporary labor,
women still face pressure to leave the workforce after marrying or having a child. Companies
are often hostile to women continuing to work after becoming mothers, and government
policies and discrimination laws may not be very strong or may not be enforced.
Childcare is expensive and sparse. Often, it does not match up with the traditional
workforce hours. If it is subsidized by the government, there are few seats, and the costs
remain high. Wait lists are extensive, and many women find themselves leaving the workforce
to care for children. Women are routinely paid less than male counterparts are, and are more
likely to engage in part time or temporary work. While there are generous maternal leave
policies, there are few protections against employment discrimination, and women are seen as
poor ‘investments’. Fathers have little or no parental leave available to them, and sometimes
even face harassment for wishing to exercise their right to leave.
Women who work also still do the lion’s share of household chores, with little aid from
male partners. Traditional gender roles are heavily pushed by society, and women who work
are often faced with a ‘second shift’ of housework after their work days are done. Marriage is
highly correlated with childbearing, and as such, there may be declining marriage rates.
Women increasingly choose to be single rather than be forced into traditional gender roles
within a marriage. The government still sees woman as the primary caregivers of children, and

66
often erroneously believes that money is the only reason women are having fewer children,
and offer baby bonuses as a solution. Gender inequality as a whole is very high.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
Fertility rates around the world have fallen in recent years, in both industrialized and
developing nations. This is not of particular concern in developing nations, but for industrialized
nations, this is a major crisis. Without major changes in societal governmental values, once
large prosperous nations now face the possibility of population shrink and the overwhelming
costs of eldercare being shouldered by fewer and fewer young workers. For nations with a
history of immigrants, this is not as immediate a problem, but for insular nations like Japan,
Italy and South Korea, this is a demographic time bomb. Low fertility is a crisis that requires a
shift in policy, thought, and behavior in all facets of society. Without those changes, formerly
powerful nations could find themselves in a continual state of shrinkage that leaves them
vulnerable to invasion, recession and rebellion. This apocalyptic view of the future may seem
fatalistic, but for insular nations like Japan who are loathe to admit immigrants to fill in the gaps
made by missing laborers, this may become reality. Italy, while not dealing with a population
decline as long or steep as Japan, also faces the challenges associated with population shrink.
The similarities between the nations with low fertility rates are startling. The similarities
in economic structure, the persistent state of economic strife, high wage gaps and massive
youth under and unemployment are astounding. The similarities in maternal support programs
are startling as well. Expensive, hard to procure day care, little or no existent paternity leave,
few protections from employment discrimination, and a general view of women as needed in
the home more than the workforce are all a match. Both Italy and Japan are also highly
traditional in terms of gender roles. These similarities show that low fertility nations do make
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the same mistakes and face the same problems. Norway is in many ways the complete
opposite of the two low fertility nations, as it has created a positive reproductive environment
that allows women and men to feel safe in their decision to create or expand their family.
Further research will hopefully prove that there are many similarities between nations with
positive reproductive climates, such as Iceland and Finland, as well. The findings of this study
confirm that there are certain healthy behaviors and characteristics that nations with healthy
fertility rate nations have in common, and certain unhealthy habits and characteristics that low
fertility rate nations have in common. These two distinct sets of characteristics, thus make up
the reproductive climate of a nation, and like the geographical or political climate of a nation,
this reproductive climate can and does influence decision making in major way.
The Reproductive Climate theory could possibly help to change the future of nations
struggling with low fertility, and help to guide nations into a more stable path. By taking a
multidisciplinary approach that accounts for multiple possible reasons for fertility results, the
possible policy changes and prescriptions take on a broader based format that allows for
policies to hit all segments of society. The current focus on one issue (such as the economy) or
even one demographic (women) creates an environment in which the government is essentially
playing single issue ‘whack-a-mole’ instead of trying to truly effect the change necessary to
improve fertility rates. By having a series of benchmarks and best practices, countries can
begin to repair their relationships with the women that live there, and to create an atmosphere
that is conducive to creating a populous society.
The biggest change in policy and social belief that needs to occur involves the raising of
children. Children have ceased to be the vital part of life that they were in the past. This is due
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to the complex nature of human interaction and decision making, as well as a shift in the way
families are formed. With the advent of the era of birth control, parenthood is now a choice
rather than a biological fact. Children are no longer a source of labor for the household, but an
optional part of the life of the couple. In making that choice, couples must weigh the costs and
benefits of having children and in industrialized nations the opportunity costs associated with
having children may not be outweighed by the joy and satisfaction that comes with raising a
family. The reproductive climate is thus a major factor in the creation of a family, and
continuing to view the choice to have children as primarily an economic concern, or an issue of
female selfishness, is a policy mistake that will result in lower fertility rates overall.
Women in particular face opportunity costs that make the idea of having children
daunting. Lost wages, lost opportunities, lost leisure time and expanded responsibility weigh
heavily on the minds of prospective mothers. And in nations with few protections for working
mothers, and where women are routinely discriminated against in the workplace in both terms
of employment and in terms of pay, many women will choose the independence and increased
opportunity that comes with being single and without children. This new found emphasis on
economic freedom, equality in both the home and the workplace, and the desire for paid work
should not be seen as the destruction of a traditional values system, or a drain on the world
economy. The contributions of women are simply now being acknowledged, and in some cases,
compensated. Nations that resist equality are in essence resisting a raise in fertility.
If low fertility rate nations, like Italy and Japan, wish to increase the fertility rate of their
nations, they must change how the government and society perceives women and the
structure of the family. Women in industrialized societies are increasingly better educated,
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ambitious, and eager to work. They seek the validation and stimulation of employment, and
wish to remain in the workplace while also having a family. In order to make it easier for
women to do that, men must become more involved in all aspects of family life, from child care
to cooking to laundry. The government must provide paternity leave and encourage men to
take it, and must also encourage a work week that allows for ample personal time for all
persons, parents or non-parents. Day care must be plentiful, cheap and quality. Above all, the
government must treat women as equal members of society, and abandon the antiquated
attitudes that allow for government policies that treat women as a source of unpaid domestic
labor.
The fertility crisis is, in essence, a culmination of multiple gap crises. The gender pay
gap exaggerates economic inequality for men and women. This is compounded by a rise in
income inequality, with the wealthy able to afford many children, and the poor and middle
class facing the choice of poverty and parenthood or economic stability and no children. The
opportunity gap that many young people in nations with rigid labor forces also leads to a gap in
wages, and a corresponding gap in fertility. The housework gap leads women to turn away from
marriage. The parental leave gap pushes men out of the home and into the workforce, and
often leaves men feeling unequipped to deal with their own children, lessening their
involvement in the home. The parental leave gap also solidifies the idea that women are not
good investments, as women will have to leave the office to care for children, while men do not
take extended leave. The day care pickup gap is also an issue- how can mothers be considered
valuable employees if their ability to work is constrained by a day care that keeps hours that are
not in line with average working hours and commutes? These various gaps reinforce each
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other, and create a culture of inequality that leads many women and men to give up on the
idea of a family, and to make the choice to pursue short term rational self interest, instead of
investing in long term biological self interest.
Nations like Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark have already caught on to the fact
that a more gender equal society leads to a more fertile, and rich, society. Other nations are
also slowly coming to the realization. Hopefully, low fertility rate nations are able to change in
time to prevent major economic and cultural disaster. Without change, the world will soon
face an unprecedented situation in which the global population is shrinking, as other nations
begin to industrialize and more women choose to prioritize economic viability rather than
maternity. Above all, governments, scholars, politicians and pundits must stop seeing the issue
of low fertility as an issue of female selfishness and as an issue of cooperation, equality, and
choice. Without affording women the respect to not denigrate them for making rational
decisions, without discarding outdated views of womanhood that regard women as a means of
reproduction instead of as a full person, the fate of fertility poor nations will not change.
Women are not the enemy in the quest for higher fertility. Feminism is not the enemy. The
enemy is poor reproductive climate, and the policies that create them.
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Glossary
Fertility Rate The number of births per woman during the fertile years of 15-40.
Freeter

A term for part time and temporary workers in Japan. A combination of
the words ‘freelance’ and ‘arubaito’ the Japanese term for a part time job.

Hokatsu

Term for the search for daycare in Japan.

NEET

Acronym standing for Not in Education Employment or Training
Coined in the United Kingdom and mean to describe unemployed youth.

Shūshīn koyo 終身雇用 The traditional system of lifetime employment in Japan,
characterized bya slow, steady rise in pay and position in return for
loyalty and hard work.
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